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ABSTRACT 
 
Wage Setting in the Colombian Manufacturing Industry* 
 
We show that wage setting in the Colombian manufacturing industry is not fundamentally 
driven by labor productivity in contrast to the standard theoretical prediction. On the contrary, 
internal institutional arrangements – payroll taxation, the minimum wage or the price wedge 
between manufacturing and consumption prices – together with a higher exposure to 
international trade – connected to the increasing globalization of the Colombian economy – 
appear as the crucial drivers. These findings lead us to question the political strategy 
followed to attain cost competitiveness in a context of growing exposure to international 
trade. Implementation of a true wage bargaining system is suggested as a critical policy 
target to prevent the disruptive economic consequences of the current wage setting 
mechanism and help rebalance the trade deficit. 
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1 Introduction
Two structural and worldwide phenomena are critically shaping policy decisions. The first
one is globalization. The second one, going in parallel, is a deindustrialization process
taking place in many countries. Globalization implies a growing exposure to interna-
tional trade that needs to be strategically handled bearing in mind the specific strengths
and weaknesses of the economy in change. The manufacturing industry is the most ex-
posed economic activity, hence the need of a careful design of the policies that will allow
industrial activities to cope.
On this account, Colombia provides an excellent experience to examine. It is one of
the considered successful economies in Latin America which, in recent decades, embarked
in an extensive liberalization program. The issue we assess here is whether this extensive
program has been translated into an eﬃcient mechanism of wage determination, at least
at the industrial level. Our conclusion is that it has not. And the reason is twofold. First,
because of the low connection between wages and productivity; and, second, because of
the failure of the policy reforms to set up a true wage bargaining system and enhance the
connection between wages and productivity.
We study wage setting in the Colombian manufacturing industry in a period in which
relatively tight labor market and trade regulations in the seventies and eighties have
been superseded by more flexible labor market institutions and trade liberalization. We
investigate, in particular, which are the crucial drivers of net real wages with explicit
focus on the role played by labor productivity, the changing institutional framework,
and the growing exposure to international trade. This analysis is conducted through
the estimation of a standard wage setting model using a panel database which covers a
long time period (1974-2009) and 19 manufacturing sectors. This estimation involves the
consideration of several type of interactions to disclose whether the institutional and trade
reform process has aﬀected the way wages respond to its driving forces.
In this context, a first salient result is the permanent low sensitivity of net real wages to
changes in labor productivity. In other words, labor productivity is not the fundamental
driver of the net real wage, is in sharp contrast with the standard theoretical prediction
of a one-to-one long-run relationship between wages and labor productivity (see Judzik
and Sala, 2013, for the simplest analytical case). The reason why this theoretical relation-
ship is far from holding in the Colombian manufacturing industry is twofold. First, the
adjustments of nominal wages are highly tied to the cost of living. Second, payroll taxes
and other non-wage costs make up a significant part of total compensation. Both features
weaken the sensitivity of net real wages to changes in labor productivity. A sensitivity
that has even decreased after the institutional and trade reform process.
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In contrast to the scarce influence of productivity, we find wages to be mainly driven
by internal institutional settings (such as payroll taxation and minimum wages), other
determinants related to the indexation of wages with respect to prices (such as the price
wedge between manufacturing and consumer prices), and openness to trade. As we explain
later, the real minimum wage and the price wedge can be considered two sides of the same
coin capturing the close attachment of wages to the evolution of prices (with real minimum
wages growing according to prices).
This leads us to specify the empirical model under two alternative settings, one with
the real minimum wage and another one with the price wedge, revealing a high sensitivity
of net real wages to changes in both the real minimum wage and the price wedge (depend-
ing on the specification). This result provides empirical evidence that the adjustments of
nominal wages are highly tied to the cost of living, which is critically driving the growth
of net real wages in the manufacturing industry. A specific feature of this result is the
absence of a significant change in the wage reaction to these driving forces, with similar
elasticities in 1976-1991 and 1992-2009.
The third main finding is the significant negative impact of payroll taxation on net
wages. Two are the reasons by which payroll taxes may cause a fall in net real wages.
The first one is to avoid an increase in total labor costs: firms try to lower net nominal
wages to compensate the increase in payroll taxation and, therefore, there is a change in
the composition of labor costs in response to the higher tax rates. The second mechanism
consists in shifting the increase in payroll taxation to selling prices to try to keep the
profitability rates unchanged. This, however, was not feasible in Colombia in a situation
of growing exposure to international trade.
The impact of payroll taxes on wages has been lower after 1992 in spite that most of
the increases in these taxes (paid by firms) took place in this period. That is, although
the payroll tax shifting continued to be significant, firms started bearing a larger share
of the payroll tax cost. This result provides evidence that some of the changes in the
institutional environment have harmed the cost competitiveness of the industrial sector.
In this context, the explanation of the lower sensitivity of real wages to payroll taxation
is twofold. First, the enhanced indexation of nominal wages to Consumer Price Index
(CPI) inflation caused net real wages to be more responsive to the price wedge (with severe
downward pressures on manufacturing prices resulting from the liberalization process) and
less to payroll taxes. Second, it was gross wages, rather than net wages, who absorbed
the bulk of the impact of the payroll tax rise (note that the gap between the growth rates
of gross and net wages tripled from 0.21 to 0.65 percentage points, as shown in Table 2).
The last finding is the significant positive impact of globalization on wages in 1976-
1991 and 1992-2009, and the slightly greater influence they have exerted in the second
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period. This positive and greater influence is interpreted along the lines of Arbache et
al. (2004), who point to the skill-biased nature of in-flowing technology (through higher
foreign direct investment and growing imports) to explain the greater demand of skilled
labor, and the resulting pressure on relative wages.
In the light of these results, we conduct a complementary exercise in which we examine
the marginal eﬀects of real minimum wages and the price wedge on net real wages, condi-
tional on the diﬀerent values taken by payroll taxation and the degree of trade openness.
In this way, we check whether the reform process (that is, the increases in payroll taxation
and the exposure to international trade) have aﬀected the way wages react to these key
determinants. We find no diﬀerence in the extent of the wage impact of real minimum
wages across periods, which remained stable in spite of the liberalization process; this
does not preclude, however, that more open sectors tend to be less responsive to changes
in the minimum wage. In turn, the sensitivity of real wages to the price wedge becomes
larger along with the degree of trade openness in a scenario of high payroll taxation such
as the one in 1992-2009. This response is clearly diﬀerent than the one in 1976-1991,
and calls for future research on the interaction between wages, payroll taxes and trade
exposure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some key features of
the Colombian economy regarding the institutional setting and the trade liberalization
process. Section 3 discusses the theoretical background on wage setting models, and their
empirical implementation in the paper. Section 4 presents the data and explains the
econometric methodology. Sections 5 and 6 deal with the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Labor market institutions and trade liberalization
2.1 Labor market reforms
The Colombian labor market is segmented. There is a massive informal sector accounting
for around 50% of employment, and a formal sector accounting for the remaining 50%.1
Within this context, the manufacturing industry is an economic activity with a relatively
low incidence of informality close to 20%.2
Since 1990, a structural reform process has been developed in view, on one side, to
enhance labor market flexibility and boost (formal) employment and expand, on the other
side, the coverage of health and pension services.
1Value for thirteen metropolitan areas in year 2013 computed from data provided by the Gran En-
cuesta Continua de Hogares (GEIH).
2It was 18.7% in 2007, in contrast to close to 75.0% in trade and services (values based on data for
thirteen metropolitan areas supplied by the GEIH).
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To achieve the first target, Law 50 was passed in 1990 to lower firing, training and
recruitment costs, and promote non-regular forms of employment. This was followed by
Law 789 in 2002, which lowered the regulated costs of non-standard employment (for
example, on weekend, night, and holiday working hours). The expectation was that such
measures would contribute to render formal employment more attractive and boost job
creation.
To expand the coverage of health and pension services, Laws 100 in 1993 and 797 in
2003 were passed to increase the Social Security revenues needed to expand the fledgling
welfare state. The first of these laws increased the payroll tax rates covering the health
and pension schemes, while the second one only focused on pensions. In this way, the total
payroll tax rate paid by firms moved from the existing 17% before these laws, to more
than 30% since the mid nineties, and beyond afterwards. Figure 1 shows this evolution
by distinguishing the four components in which payroll taxes are classified in Colombia:
parafiscal, health, pension and professional hazards.3
Figure 1. Payroll taxes paid by firms. 1975-2009.
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Source: Own calculation based on data from LEGIS’ oﬃcial annual reports.4
There is ample literature on institutions referring to the supposedly ‘labor-unfriendly’
impact of payroll tax rate increases. This common view may be one of the reasons why,
3The parafiscal contributions are payroll taxes which are only paid by firms. They have been used
to finance the Family Compensation System, the National Service of Learning (SENA by its acronym in
Spanish) and the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF by its acronym in Spanish). The health and
pension payroll taxes correspond to contributions that firms and employees must shell out in a traditional
social security system. The professional hazards are payroll taxes paid by firms that have been used to
fund the General System of Occupational Risks, whose aim is to protect and assist workers from the
eﬀects of diseases and accidents that may befall them during or as a result of their work. In this study
we take into account all payroll taxes paid by firms.
4Cartilla Laboral, years 1989-2009; and Cartilla de la Seguridad Social, years 1990-2009.
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without hardly any assessment on the estimated consequences of the previous measures,
the government decided to lower first (by Law 1429 of Formalization and employment
generation in 2010), and then eliminate, the parafiscal and health contributions paid by
firms (by Law 1607 in 2012).
One exception in the virtual lack of assessment of the consequences of the rise in payroll
taxes in Colombia is the work by Kugler and Kugler (2009). Their results show that a
10% increase in payroll taxes reduces wages of production workers by 1.46%, wages of
nonproduction workers by 2.75%, production employment by 5.14%, and nonproduction
employment by 4.38%.5
Another critical labor market institution is the minimum wage. Although the gov-
ernment had the power to set a minimum wage since 1945 (by Law 6), it was in 1949
when it was eﬀectively implemented for the first time. The minimum wage is indexed on
a yearly basis following the previous year CPI inflation rate. Its growth cannot be inferior
to this rate,6 which is the same irrespective of the economic sector (see Hofstetter, 2005,
for details).
In practice, it turns out that the real minimum wage operates as a sort of reservation
wage which not only is a floor wage (in levels), but also a reference for wage increases in
formal activities. Hence their strong correlation, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Real wages of the manufacturing industry 1975-2009.
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Source: EAM for the net real wage and legislation published annually for the minimum wage.
5Production workers (or employment) include workers in tasks strictly related to productive activities
(usually called blue-collar), while nonproduction workers (or employment) include workers in administra-
tive tasks (usually called white-collar). This is the distinction made by Kugler and Kugler (2009) because
of the source data they work with.
6This was started by judgment C-815 of the Constitution Court in 1999 as a consequence of the loss
of purchasing power of the minimum wage in the eighties and early nineties.
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Finally, although the Colombian labor legislation recognizes unions as a part of the
labor relations system, its role in wage-setting matters is nowadays minimal and essentially
restricted to collective bargaining at the firm-level. Union density in Colombia is around
4%, while the coverage of collective agreements is less than 2% (data from ENS).
2.2 Trade reforms
In parallel to the labor market reform process, Colombia also embarked in a process of
external liberalization in the 1990s. The first step in this process took place unilaterally
in 1990, when the political authorities increased the Colombian exposure to international
trade by reducing, simultaneously, import controls and import tariﬀs. In this way, free
imports (i.e., custom non-controlled imports) rose from 14.8% in 1985 to 96.7% in 1990,
while the average customs duty rate was reduced from 38.9% in 1990 to 12.0% in 1995.
In addition, between 1992 and 2004, Colombia enjoyed a new system of preferential
tariﬀs to export to the US.7 This system was superseded in 2004 by Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs) between Colombia and a number of relevant trade partners such as the US, the
European Union, Canada, Mexico, Korea, Chile, Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
As a consequence, trade openness (i.e., the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP)
increased from below 25% in 1990 to more than 40% today (Figure 3a). Therefore,
although Colombia is still considered a relatively closed economy, in the last two decades
it experienced a significant change in its overall degree of globalization as measured, for
example, by the KOF index (Figure 3b). From a value of 34.3% in 1975, this index only
increased by 4 percentage points up to 1990 (34.2%). The steep slope thereafter reflects
the liberalization process of the Colombian economy, leading the KOF index to reach 57%
in 2009.
In this context, the manufacturing industry has been the most aﬀected sector in Colom-
bia, with a steady increase in the imports share that attained 90% of total Colombian
imports in 2009 (see Figure A1a in the Appendix), and a share of exports above 60% of
total exports, in contrast to a share of less than 15% in terms of GDP. Still more impor-
tant, trade openness in this sector (i.e., the ratio of industrial exports and imports over
total industrial output) doubled from an average of 48.2% in 1974-1991, to one of 96.8%
in 1992-2009.8
7The APTA was signed in December 1991. Through this agreement around 5,600 products were
granted free access to the US market in exchange of a renewed focus on economic activities and jobs
aiming at replacing the cocaine industry. This agreement was subsequently prolonged and extended,
2002 onwards, through the APTDEA.
8Detailed information by sectors is provided in the Appendix. All industries, but one (publishing and
printing recorded media, just accounting for around 3% of total industrial GDP) were subject to this
process, and there are no significant composition eﬀects within the manufacturing industry in Colombia:
the GDP share of the largest sector (on food products and beverages) remained stable at 28-29%, while
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Figure 3. Globalization in Colombia. 1974-2009.
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A related critical issue is that the leading role played by the manufacturing sector in
the opening process of Colombia has been accompanied by a large deterioration of its
international competitiveness. This is illustrated in Figure A1b, which shows a structural
trade deficit that became much larger on averages since the nineties.
3 Wage setting
3.1 Theoretical background
Standard wage setting models have been developed both in perfect and imperfect compe-
tition contexts.
A relevant example of a perfect competition wage setting model can be found in
Kugler and Kugler (2009), where the market-clearing wage and employment levels are set
to equate the demand and supply of labor. Firms choose employment by equating the
gross marginal labor costs —net wage plus payroll taxes— with the marginal revenue of
producing an extra unit of output. In turn, workers set their labor supply as a function of
net wages and their prospective social security benefits received in exchange of the payroll
tax paid by firms. This gives form to the tax/benefit linkage developed in Summers (1989).
The outcome of this model is that wages are set as a function of the labor demand and
labor supply elasticities with respect to wages, and also with respect to the payroll tax
(paid by firms) and the valuation made by workers over the benefit received.
In a context of imperfect competition, the traditional classification distinguishes eﬃ-
ciency wage from collective bargaining models such as the insider-outsider or union models
—Lindbeck and Snower (2001), Booth (2014). Within this vast strand of literature, the
the five largest sectors (S1, S3, S12, S10 and S9 in Table A1) accounted for 62.2% the industrial GDP in
the first period, and 65.9% in the second one.
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work by Prodecca (2011) provides an encompassing model in which a large number of
identical unions and firms set real wages in a Nash bargaining framework. Empirically,
her model states that the real wage is related to the following six fundamental variables:
labor productivity (), the unemployment rate (), the replacement ratio (),
union bargaining strength (), payroll taxes/non-wage costs ( ), and income taxes ( ).
By solving the theoretical model in a Cobb-Douglas framework and log-linearizing the
resulting expression, Prodecca (2011) obtains her core empirical equation:
log () = 0 + 1 log ¡¢− 2 log () + 3 log () (1)
+4 log () + 5 log (  ) + 6 log
¡ ¢+ 
To study the Colombian case, this benchmark expression needs to be adapted at least
for a twofold reason. First, because some institutional features that are generally consid-
ered as crucial in developed economies, are less relevant in Colombia. Consequently, we
lack times series information to be included in the analysis. Second, because the bench-
mark model we have considered does not account for the role of the external sector which,
as we have discussed, is likely to have aﬀected wage determination in the manufacturing
industry. On top of these reasons, some data is simply not available.
Therefore, we next discuss the adjustments and extensions we introduce to the bench-
mark equation (1).
3.2 Empirical implementation
The first adjustment relates to the replacement ratio, which is essentially nonexistent in
Colombia as a source of income for unemployed. There is a related in-kind benefit which
was to a large extent improperly used (not as a true unemployment benefit) before the
2013 reform. This aﬀects the term 3 log (), which is dropped from the analysis.9
The second adjustment refers to union power in whatever form (measures of trade
union density, number of strikes, or days lost due to labor conflicts). Although there is
data since the 1990s, any measure related to union power was not relevant as explanatory
variable in subsample regressions conducted for 1992-2009. This is the reason why the
term 4 log () is omitted.
A final adjustment is the exclusion of 6 log ( ) due to the lack of information on
income taxes in consistent time series. One problem is that eﬀective tax rates are not
9At this point, it is worth noting that although a system of unemployment benefits exists in Colombia
since 2002 (by Law 789), it had to be restructured in 2013 to enforce its use in correspondence to its
nature. This implies, in contrast to the emphasis placed by the literature on the wage impact of such
benefits, that the unemployment benefit system in Colombia has been irrelevant as a determinant of wage
setting.
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available. The other problem is that using the statutory rates would not be accurate given
the features of our panel data. The reason is that the income tax scheme sets diﬀerentiated
rates by income group, with low incomes subject to tax exemptions. Therefore, as we only
have data on average wages across sectors, the use of statutory tax rates could distort the
true eﬀect of income taxation on wages.
The central institutional extension is the inclusion of the real minimum wage, which
acts as a reference for real wages. This implies considering the new term 2 log ¡min ¢,
where min denotes the real minimum wage. A positive sign on ˆ2 is expected.
This extension is consistent with the findings in Iregui et al. (2012), who show that
nominal minimum wage increases and past inflation are considered as important factors
by firms when adjusting their nominal wages. Their analysis also reveals that most firms
adjust nominal wages annually at rates that are roughly equivalent to the observed rate
of CPI inflation, and none of them cut wages.
A second extension is related to relative prices and seeks to capture the role exerted
by the price wedge between manufacturing and total prices in wage setting. The variable
we consider is , the ratio of manufacturing prices ( ) over consumption prices (),
and we expect a negative influence over net real wages. The reason is the following.
Over time, manufacturing prices tend to grow less than consumption prices for a twofold
reason. First, it is a capital-intensive sector subject to quick technological change and
eﬃciency gains that are translated into lower prices (or higher quality at equal prices).
Second, it is the most exposed sector to global competition and, as such, bears the most
important downward pressure on prices. This forces firms to use labor compensation as a
key adjustment mechanism to ensure competitiveness. In this context, given that nominal
wages in Colombia are indexed to the CPI, the larger is the wedge between the two, the
bigger is the tension in terms of the wage setting mechanism: while workers grade their
net wages having as reference consumption prices, firms appraise their expected benefits
as a function of manufacturing prices. Here is the wedge and the tension pushing real net
wages down when the wedge increases.
An important remark here is that the real minimum wage and the price wedge can
be considered two sides of the same coin capturing the close attachment of wages to the
evolution of prices. The reason is the following. If nominal minimumwages are closely tied
to consumption prices, then the ratio (min  ) will not diﬀer that much in its evolution
from the price ratio  , which is the inverse of our price wedge variable   . Having
confirmed this empirically, our empirical models will take two alternative forms to avoid
multicollinearity problems, one with the real minimum wages as explanatory variable, as
in equation (2) below; and a second one considering the price wedge instead: equation (3).
A final extension is related to the external sector and consists on the inclusion of a
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measure of trade openness () through the addition of the new aggregate term 4 log ().
The expected incidence of international trade, or globalization, on net wages is not clear.
On one side, the literature is still far from reaching consensus on the causal relationship
between exports and productivity (and thus wages). Some relevant studies argue that
exports cause eﬃciency gains (and would thus boost wages), while some other claim that
eﬃciency progress is what allows exports to increase.
In the case of Colombia, we have two pieces of information that make us look at the
imports’ side. First, exports have not led the opening process (see Figure 3a). Second, as
shown by Figure A1a in the Appendix, the share of manufacturing exports has remained
stable between 1965 and 2010. Hence, if the industrial imports of goods are the catalyst
variable, then we should expect a positive influence on net wages for a twofold reason.10
First, on account of the positive relationship between wages and the import of inter-
mediate goods, as demonstrated in Amiti and Davis (2011). This hypothesis is endorsed
by the fact that two thirds of total industrial imports in Colombia consist on intermediate
inputs. And second because, as pointed out by Arbache et al. (2004), one of the con-
sequences of increasing trade openness is a rapid inflow of foreign technology as a result
both of foreign direct investment and increased imports. In-flowing technology is skill-
biased because it is mainly designed in industrialized economies which are relatively skill
intensive. Thus, the acquisition of new technologies from developing countries is normally
accompanied by a greater demand of skilled labor. On the positive side this causes an
upward pressure on relative wages (which is the eﬀect we are capturing), although there
is also a negative consequence in terms of increased wage inequality.11
Overall, these empirical adjustments and extensions leave us with two versions of the
empirical model. In the first version, we have the real minimum wages:
log () = 0+ 1 log ¡¢+ 2 log () + 3 log ¡min ¢+ 4 log(  ) + 5 log () + 
(2)
while in the second version we have the ratio of manufacturing prices over consumption
prices:
log () = 0+1 log ¡¢+2 log ()+3 log ()+4 log(  )+5 log ()+ (3)
10Relevant studies claiming a negative relationship between imports and local wages point to massive
imports of consumption goods in developed economies. For example, for the United States, Autor et al.
(2013, 2014) show that wages/cumulative earnings were lower after the spectacular rising of the Chinese
imports, mainly of consumption goods.
11Growing empirical evidence on the eﬀects of globalization gives support to a positive relationship
between trade liberalization and wage inequality in developing countries —see, for example, Caselli (2014),
Meschi and Vivarelli (2009), and Attanasio et al. (2004).
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To conclude, note that all coeﬃcients will have to be interpreted as delivering elasticities.
It is in this context that we treat payroll taxes as the tax wedge between gross and net
wages.
4 Empirical issues
4.1 Data
We use a panel database with a cross-section dimension of  = 19 sectors and a time
dimension of  = 34 years covering the period 1976-2009.12 Table 1 presents the variables
and the corresponding sources.
Net average real wages per worker are obtained from the Annual Manufacturing Sur-
vey (Encuesta Anual Manufacturera, EAM), which is produced by the National Adminis-
trative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística,
DANE). It is calculated as the real wage bill before taxes in sector  over paid employment
in that sector. Labor productivity is computed as the real value added in sector  over
total employment in that sector, where total employment includes paid and unpaid work-
ers. It is also obtained from the EAM. As explained above, trade openness is computed
as exports plus imports in sector  over output in that sector. It is also obtained from the
EAM. Note that these are the three variables for which detailed homogeneous time series
information across sectors exists.
As stated, informal employment in Colombia is massive. This goes together with very
limited statistics covering labor issues in non-urban areas. Consequently, the unemploy-
ment rate series available for the whole sample period is based on urban unemployment.
Although it does not exactly fit the industrial sector, this is the only one we can use.
Data on nominal minimum wages is collected from public information/legislation pub-
lished annually. Similarly, the statutory payroll tax rates (including health, pension, pro-
fessional hazards, and parafiscal contributions) are computed from information supplied
by LEGIS in its oﬃcial annual reports. Note, therefore, that we use statutory rates in-
stead of any sort of eﬀective tax rate. In this way, we avoid dealing with econometric
problems related to the use of eﬀective tax rates, namely the simultaneity in the deter-
mination of wages and payroll tax rates, and spurious variability in payroll tax rates. In
turn, the number of national strikes is obtained from the national trade union institution
(Escuela Sindical Nacional, ENS). Note, however, that this variable is only available from
1992 onwards and can only be used for the second part of the sample.
12The detailed list of sectors is provided in Table A1, in the Appendix.
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Manufacturing prices and the CPI index are also taken from the DANE. These two
indices are used to compute the ratio of relative prices.
Table 1. Definitions of variables.
Variables Sources Other variables and subindices
 Net real wage (1) 92 Dummy: value 1 1992 onwards
 Real GDP (1) 8083 Dummy: value 1 in 1980-1983
 Total employment (1) 9700 Dummy: value 1 in 1997-2000
 labor productivity (1) 0809 Dummy: value 1 in 2008-2009
 Trade openness
h
(+)
i
(1)  = 1  19 sectors
 Urban unemployment (2)  = 1  34 years
min Real minimum wage (3)
  Statutory payroll tax rates (4)
 Manufacturing prices (2)
 CPI deflator (2)
 Relative prices £  ¤ (2)
Notes: All nominal variables are deflated by the manufacturing price index (base: June 1999).
(1) EAM; (2) DANE; (3) Legislation published annually; (4) LEGIS.
We include a set of time dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks that may aﬀect
all sectors. In this way, 92 help us to capture potential structural breaks in the wage
elasticities arising from the institutional and trade reform process; 8083 accounts for the
impact of the international debt crisis experienced by Latin America in the early eighties;
9700 and 0809 checks whether the international financial crisis at the end of the nineties
and the Great Recession did also aﬀect wages in Colombia.
All nominal variables are deflated with the manufacturing price index.
4.2 Stylized facts
Table 2 provides descriptive information on some crucial macroeconomic variables of in-
terest. Subscript  denotes information corresponding to the average of the 19 sectors
in which the Colombian industry is disaggregated. Detailed industry information is not
available for the real minimum wage, manufacturing prices, the CPI index, and the payroll
tax rate. All data is supplied for the two relevant periods of analysis —the slow transition
between import substitution and trade liberalization in 1976-1991; and the institutional
and trade reforms years of 1992-2009.
Since the mid-seventies until 2009, real economic growth of the Colombian manufac-
turing sectors was around 4.2% on average, with no significant diﬀerences between periods.
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In spite of these positive growth rates throughout, the industrial standstill in the seventies
and the debt crisis in the eighties resulted in low employment growth rates (0.3 % on av-
erage in 1976-1991) and, thus, in high labor productivity growth rates (3.8% on average).
In contrast, gross wages (i.e., the addition of net wages and statutory payroll taxes) grew
at 2.1%, thus prompting an annual fall in the unit labor costs of 1.7% on average. Note
also, that net real wages (payroll taxes excluded) and real minimum wages grew in line
(at around 1.9%) reflecting highly tied adjustments to the cost of living. These years were
also characterized by high inflation rates, amounting to 22.5% if measured by the CPI,
and 21.5% by manufacturing prices. As a consequence, the price wedge went down by 1
percentage point annually, on average.
Table 2. Macro developments in the Colombian manufacturing industry.
      [(1+ )]
1976-1991 4.16 0.31 3.85 1.94 16.1 2.13
1992-2009 4.30 -0.30 4.60 3.85 28.9 4.50
1976-2009 4.23 0.70 3.53 2.99 23.1 3.42
     (1+ )

1976-1991 1.86 21.5 22.5 -0.97 48.4 -1.72
1992-2009 3.59 9.0 11.2 -2.23 96.8 -0.10
1976-2009 2.80 14.9 16.5 -1.64 74.0 -0.11
Notes:  denotes the growth rate corresponding to the annual average of the sectorial
growth rates. All variables are expressed in percent.
The nineties were years of labor reform and trade liberalization processes, but also
of deindustrialization and growing expansion of the services sector. They were followed,
though, by the recovery of the manufacturing sector in 2000-2009 driven by a rising
capital accumulation (boosted both by domestic and foreign direct investment)13 and
the substitution of domestic by imported raw materials. Altogether, these developments
caused employment to fall (by 0.30% annually, on average) and resulted in the acceleration
of the growth rate of labor productivity (4.6%), which was 0.8 percentage points larger
than in 1974-1991. In turn, gross real wages grew in line with productivity (4.5% on
average), thus denying further progress in real unit labor costs. Beyond productivity
gains, it should be noted that upward pressures on gross real wages arose from increases
in payroll taxes paid by firms, and from the acceleration in the increase of the price wedge,
13In the seventies and eighties, FDI represented 0.3% of the GDP on average, while between 1997 and
2007 it represented 3.8%. Source: DANE.
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reflecting the speedier deceleration of inflation in manufacturing prices than in the cost
of living.
These contrasted periods, both in terms of economic developments and policy agenda
(as discussed in Section 2), lead us to the estimation of equations (2) and (3) taking into
account potential changes in the elasticities brought by the new institutional framework.
As we explain next, this estimation is conducted by considering several types of dummies
and interactions among selected explanatory variables.
4.3 Econometric methodology
Empirical equations (2) and (3) are extended in two directions. First, due to the relevance
of adjustment costs in wage setting, we consider the addition of the first lag of the ex-
planatory variable. This enables us to perform a dynamic analysis and to compute short-
and long-run eﬀects of each explanatory variable on net real wage. Second, as we work
with a two-dimensional panel data, we add fixed eﬀects in order to control for unobserved
heterogeneity among sectors.
Given the dynamic nature of the extended models, equations (2) and (3) will be
estimated as partial adjustment models taking the following general form:
ln () =  +  ln−1 +  ln +   ∼  ¡0 2 ¢ (4)
where the subscripts  and  are sector and time indices, respectively;  is a sectorial
cross-section intercept; −1 is the lagged dependent variable with  as inertial (or
persistence) coeﬃcient;  is a vector of explanatory and control variables with  as the
set of estimated parameters capturing their influence on the dependent variable ; and
 is the error term.
4.3.1 Unit root tests
As we deal with a dynamic panel, we must ensure that a long-run equilibrium relationship
exists among the variables considered. This implies testing that all variables are stationary
(0) which, by definition, yields a long-run cointegrating vector.
In order to check the order of integration of the variables, we perform a set of sta-
tionary and panel unit root tests depending on the type of variables to be dealt with.
In particular, we use the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) stationary-test
—KPSS henceforth— for the variables that are common across sectors. For the variables
that are sector-specific, we use the test proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) —MW—,
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which is a panel unit root test based on Fisher’s (1932) results.14 The MW test assumes,
under the null hypothesis, that all series are non-stationary, against the alternative that
at least one series in the panel is stationary. We use the KPSS test because it allows
direct testing of the null hypothesis of stationarity.
Table 3. Unit Root Tests, 1974-2009.
Diﬀerent variables across sectors Common variables across sectors
        
Null hypothesis: individual unit root process Null hypothesis: variable is stationary
MW 13443
[0000] 11174[0000] 5055[0084] KPSS 008[0146] 008[0146] 009[0146] 007[0146]
Result I(0) I(0) I(0) Result I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Notes: All variables are expressed in logs; MW and KPSS tests computed using intercept and trend;
for the MW test, p-values in brackets; for the KPSS test, 5% critical values in brackets.
On the other hand, we conduct the MW test because, in general, panel-based unit
root tests have higher power than unit root tests when applied to individual time series.
Moreover, this test has two attractive characteristics. First, it does not restrict the autore-
gressive parameter to be homogeneous across sectors under the alternative of stationarity.
Second, the choice of the lag length and the inclusion of a time trend in individual ADF
test regressions can be determined separately for each sector.
As noted in the last row of Table 3, the overall conclusion drawn from these tests is
that all variables are stationary (0). Hence, we can proceed with stationary panel data
estimation techniques.
4.3.2 Estimation method
Given the panel structure of our database, models (2) and (3) are estimated by applying
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Eﬀects (FE). In doing so, we need to take care of
potential endogeneity problems caused by the introduction of lagged dependent variables
in the set of regressors; by the well-known simultaneity between net real wages, labor
productivity, and unemployment; and by the potential correlation between relative prices
and the error term, on account of the simultaneity of wage and price setting.
Regarding the first potential problem, it is well known that OLS estimates gives rise
to a “dynamic panel bias” (Nickell, 1981) causing the persistence coeﬃcient to be overes-
timated. The reason is that the estimated coeﬃcient on lagged wages will be inflated by
attributing some predictive power to it that actually belongs to the sector’s fixed eﬀect.
14Using Monte Carlo simulations, Maddala and Wu (1999) conclude that the Fisher test is a better
test than the Levin and Lin (1993) and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) tests. They also highlight that
the Fisher test is simple and straightforward to use.
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A potential response would then be to apply the within-groups (or fixed eﬀects) estima-
tor, but this does not fully oﬀset the dynamic panel bias. This was explained by Nickell
(1981), who pointed out, also, that when  is large and  is small (  ), this bias is
likely to be insignificant. In contrast, Judson and Owen (1999) found that even with a
time dimension as large as 30, this estimator would be downward biased and inconsistent
even in the absence of serial correlation in the error term.
Although this may not be a critical problem in our analysis (we have  = 34 and
 = 19), we can not fully exclude the existence of a dynamic panel bias. We have thus
estimated diﬀerent versions of the Least Squares Dummy Variables Corrected (LSDVC)
using Bruno’s (2005) approximation to correct for the finite-sample bias. The correspond-
ing results, presented in the Appendix (Table A2), show that these sets of estimates do
not diﬀer and allow us to conclude that the FE estimator is potent in our case.
We have not compute the System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which
is a common option to deal with dynamic panel biases. The reason is that the consistency
of this estimator depends on the fact that  → ∞ grows suﬃciently fast relative to  .
Since this is not the case here, the estimation by System GMM would not yield dramatic
consistency gains over the FE estimator; not to mention the instrument proliferation
problem, which emerges even we limit and collapse the massive amount of instruments
due to the number of potentially endogenous regressors in our empirical models.
Thus, to deal with the potential endogeneity of labor productivity, the price wedge
and unemployment, we estimate FE by Two Stage Least Squares (FE-2SLS), where the
instruments are lags and diﬀerences of the explanatory variables. To select the most
appropriate set of instruments we rely on the performance of the following sets of tests.
First, an LM test checking for underidentification (i.e., that the excluded instruments are
not relevant, meaning non correlated with the endogenous regressors). This is denoted
as  in Tables 5 and A3, and the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified
(against the alternative that the model is identified). Second, the Hansen test of overi-
dentifying restrictions (denoted as ), in which the joint null hypothesis is, on one side,
that the considered instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and, on
the other side, that the excluded instruments are correctly dropped from the estimated
equation. Third, an  test checking for weak identification (denoted as  ), where the
null hypothesis is that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors, but
only weakly.15
15Note that for this test we do not show the critical values (since the standard ones of Stock and Yogo,
2005, are not available), and we follow “the rule of thumb” of suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) in
such cases: an  -statistic near or above 10.
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5 Results
Tables 4 and 5 present, respectively, the estimated short- and long-run elasticities ob-
tained through the various estimation methods just discussed: OLS (in columns 1 and
5) displayed as a reference to check whether the persistence coeﬃcients obtained by the
other methods are lower, as expected; FE (in columns 2 and 6); and FE-2SLS (in columns
3, 4, 7 and 8).
In the specification presented in column 3, we consider labor productivity and the
respective interaction as weakly exogenous. By so doing, we use as instruments lags and
diﬀerences (the first lag and the diﬀerence of the third lag for labor productivity, and just
the first lag for the interaction term). In the specification of column 4, we also consider
unemployment and their interaction with the dummy variable as weakly exogenous, and
use the first lag in both cases. Regarding the specifications presented in columns 7 and
8, we keep these assumptions and further consider the price wedge and its interaction as
endogenous, having their second lag as instrument.16
All this information is classified in two blocks, the one on the left-hand-side corre-
sponding to the estimation of equation (2) and the one on the right-hand-side to equation
(3).
To these benchmark empirical models we add interactions between dummy and ex-
planatory variables so as to capture potential structural changes related to the Colombian
institutional reform process. Accordingly, we next overview the results, and place some
attention on the stability, or not, of the estimated elasticities between 1976-1991 and
1992-2009.
5.1 Wage setting before the reform process (1976-1991)
When examining the econometric analysis, if we have to favor some particular specifica-
tion, we would choose the results in columns 4 and 8 for a three-fold reason: (i) instrumen-
tal variables are used to deal with potential endogeneity problems; (ii) the performance
of the instrumental variable tests confirm the appropriateness of the instruments in most
cases (since they are simultaneously exogenous and highly correlated with the endoge-
nous regressors); and (iii) all variables have the expected sign according to the underlying
theoretical relationships.
In any case, the four sets of estimates (i.e., those presented in columns 3 and 4 in
the left block, and those in columns 7 and 8 in the right block) provide a similar picture
16It is worth noting that we have estimated a wide set of specifications using diﬀerent combinations
of instruments depending on whether we consider labor productivity, unemployment and the price wedge
either as weakly exogenous variables or endogenous. However, we only present those specifications with
the best performance in the instrumental tests.
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with significant eﬀects on net wages of labor productivity, the real minimum wage, the
price wedge and payroll taxes, all displaying the expected sign. In contrast, the role of
trade openness is found mildly significant and not very strong, while the evidence on the
unemployment rate is mixed.
Regarding the first model, results in column 4 display a short-run elasticity of wages
with respect to labor productivity of 0.32 (Table 5) increasing to 44% in the long-run
(Table 6) but still far away from unity, which is the theoretical benchmark value. Since
only 44% of productivity gains are translated into a higher net compensation of workers
(32% initially), wage setting in the Colombian manufactory industry is not fundamentally
driven by labor productivity. This leaves space for other potentially more relevant de-
terminants related to institutional arrangements (such as payroll taxation and minimum
wages) and other determinants related to the indexation of wages with respect to prices
(again the minimum wage or, alternatively, the price wedge), which will turn out to be
crucial wage setting drivers.
The short-run elasticity of wages with respect to the real minimumwage is estimated at
0.95, increasing to 1.30 in the long-run. This captures the upward pressure that minimum
wages exert on wages and implies that a 1% increase in the real minimum wage causes net
real wages to grow by 1.30% (0.95% initially). The counterpart of this result is provided
in column 8, in which the real minimum wage is replaced by the price wedge. We find
that the short-run elasticity of wages with respect to relative prices is -3.12, increasing
to -5.80 in the long-run. This implies that a 1% increase in the ratio of manufacturing
prices over consumption prices cause wages to decrease by 5.80% overall (3.12% initially).
In other words, from this alternative specification, we are able to gauge to what extent
manufacturing firms are forced to reduce wages to regain competitiveness when prices of
manufacture goods become relatively more expensive (and vice-versa).
Regarding payroll taxation, the short-run coeﬃcient of -0.94 increases to -1.30 in the
long-run. This implies that 94% percentage of the tax burden is immediately shifted to
workers in the form of lower net wages, which further decrease in the long-run. This is
the outcome of the direct and indirect eﬀects of payroll taxes on labor market outcomes:
they have a negative impact on the labor demand (on account of the extra labor cost they
represent for employers), but they also decrease net real wages and generate a compen-
sation eﬀect. Which eﬀect dominates crucially depends on wage persistence. In case of
significant wage persistence (and hence a large long-run eﬀect), wage compression may
overcome the direct negative eﬀects on employment generated by payroll taxation.
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Table 4. Estimated wage equations.
Dependent variable: 
MODEL I MODEL II
OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
−1 079
[0000] 042[0001] 025[0094] 027[0080] 082[0000] 054[0000] 045[0002] 046[0002]
  008
[0000] 003[0363] 033[0020] 032[0015] 007[0000] 003[0382] 027[0041] 023[0067]
 −012
[0025]
−015
[0000]
−005
[0215]
−015
[0318]
−001
[0696]
004
[0257] 011[0035] 018[0001]
 038
[0000] 069[0000] 078[0000] 095[0000]
 −137
[0000]
−146
[0000]
−237
[0000]
−312
[0000]
  −040
[0001]
−024
[0000]
−090
[0026]
−094
[0012]
−040
[0000]
−013
[0038]
−074
[0034]
−082
[0010]
 001
[0015] 000[0703] 008[0112] 008[0117] 001[0038] 000[0598] 006[0152] 005[0155]
92 −040
[0509]
016
[0717] 041[0272] 109[0332] 026[0534] 061[0034] −154[0106] −161[0009]
−1∗92 013
[0005] 014[0027] 048[0000] 046[0000] 011[0019] 010[0103] 035[0002] 032[0012]
 ∗92 −005
[0032]
−004
[0342]
−025
[0000]
−024
[0000]
−004
[0072]
−002
[0492]
−020
[0004]
−017
[0024]
∗92 005
[0345] 012[0003] −001[0862] 005[0769] 003[0347] 003[0417] −011[0203] −017[0053]
 ∗92 −005
[0695]
−013
[0123]
−046
[0003]
−059
[0034]
∗92 011
[0650] −001[0970] 130[0002] 179[0011]
 ∗92 008
[0555] 010[0223] 066[0057] 072[0033] −029[0028] −041[0000] 016[0627] 017[0423]
∗92 −001
[0049]
−002
[0028]
−004
[0047]
−004
[0045]
−001
[0108]
−001
[0108]
−003
[0093]
−003
[0093]
8083 −003
[0172]
−006
[0000]
−006
[0000]
−008
[0001]
−002
[0195]
−002
[0092]
−002
[0145]
−002
[0105]
9700 002
[0047] 001[0062] 002[0051] 003[0028] −003[0000] −005[0000] −002[0363] −003[0068]
0809 −004
[0029]
−002
[0259]
−002
[0177]
−003
[0076]
−006
[0000]
−004
[0103]
−005
[0047]
−006
[0074]
 −058
[0195]
−046
[0341]
249
[0029] 437[0259]
 646 646 627 627 646 646 627 627
2 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.93
 623
[0044] 661[0037] 553[0063] 775[0021]
 049
[0486] 111[0291] 029[0588] 021[0643]
 28.32 14.80 15.31 7.39
Notes: All variables are expressed in logs. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.
FE: Fixed Eﬀects. FE-2SLS: Fixed eﬀects using Two Step Least Squares.
 : Under identification test.  : Hansen test.  : Weak identification test.
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In any case, whether the increase in the payroll taxes caused significant job cuts, or
not, in Colombia is something we cannot answer properly in this study. It is generally
expected that the larger the extent of payroll tax shifting on net wages, the lower the
negative consequences on employment. However, there is not yet a consensus in the
literature on the fact that cutting payroll taxes increases employment (and vice-versa).
Rather, the empirical evidence suggests that payroll taxation might have asymmetric
eﬀects on wages and employment. On one side, there are studies suggesting that payroll
tax increases have negative eﬀects on net wages and employment —Kugler and Kugler
(2009), Beach and Baulfour (1983), and Hamermesh (1979); while, on the other side,
there are even more studies showing that payroll tax rate cuts do not generate significant
eﬀects on employment, even though they have sizeable positive eﬀects on net real wages
—Cruces et al. (2010), Bennmarker et al. (2009), Bauer and Riphahn (2002), and Gruber
(1997).17
In the case of the unemployment rate, the results diﬀer between models. Estimates
for model (2) point to the irrelevance of unemployment on wage determination (see the
non-significant coeﬃcients in columns 3 and 4), while the estimates for model (3) suggest
a significant and positive influence, at odds the standard theoretical prediction (columns 7
and 8). On this account, we have verified a negative correlation of 0.59 between the unem-
ployment rate and the price wedge, which seems to be aﬀecting the estimated coeﬃcient
on unemployment (the one on the price wedge is robust to the absence of unemployment
as explanatory variable, but the contrary does not hold). This is the reason why we
credit the results from model (2). In this way, the irrelevance of urban unemployment as
determinant of net real wages may be a reflection that it is a poor proxy of the dynamics
of industrial unemployment or, being a reasonable proxy after all, may be a proof of the
findings in Iregui et al. (2012), who show that Colombian firms consider some aggregate
factors, the unemployment rate among them, as having minor relevance in determining
nominal wage increases.
The last result is the scant influence exerted by the degree of international trade
openness on wage setting. The short-run elasticity, which is 0.08 and increases to 0.11
in the long-run, indicates that a 1% increase in the degree of trade openness causes net
real wages to grow by 0.11%. This result is not surprising given that in the seventies
and eighties Colombia was a closed economy, and the industry was mainly based on
manufactures that had a low international exposure. Of course, some branches had already
high rates of trade openness (for example, the manufacture of machinery and equipment;
17There is also an issue related to the consequences of changes in social protection systems (and the
corresponding taxation changes) on formal and informal employment. For Colombia this is studied in
Camacho et al. (2014), who show that informal employment increased by 4 percentage points as a
consequence of the government’s expansion of social programs in the early 1990s.
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and medical instruments), but they represented a minimal share of the industry (2.4%).
Table 5. Long-run elasticities.
1976-1991
MODEL I MODEL II
OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
() 0.41 0.05 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.07 0.50 0.43
 -0.56 -0.25 -0.07 -0.20 -0.07 0.08 0.20 0.34
 1.83 1.18 1.05 1.30
 -7.48 -3.19 -4.34 -5.80
  -1.93 -0.41 -1.21 -1.30 -2.25 -0.34 -1.35 -1.52
 0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.10
1992-2009
MODEL I MODEL II
OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
() 0.40 -0.01 0.29 0.29 0.41 0.02 0.40 0.28
 -0.89 -0.07 -0.24 -0.35 0.80 0.04 -0.44 0.06
 4.54 1.25 1.20 1.33
 -17.8 -4.05 -5.53 -6.04
 -4.44 -0.32 -0.90 -0.86 -9.84 -1.51 -3.02 -2.95
 0.00 -0.05 0.15 0.15 0.00 -0.05 0.17 0.12
In any case, the positive influence of trade openness on wage setting should be inter-
preted in connection to the works by Amiti and Davis (2011) and Arbache et al. (2004).
That is, our result is on one side connected to the positive relationship between wages and
the import of intermediate goods, which was large in the Colombian industry. And, on
the other side, to the hypothesis of skill-biased technological change and the subsequent
increase in skilled-labor wages, which is likely to apply to those manufacturing sectors
more (and growingly) exposed to international trade.
Finally, the macroeconomic shocks controlled by the additive dummies (8083, 9700,
and 0809) have had, in general, a significant influence on wages (although there are some
exceptions depending on the specification): clearly negative during the debt and Great
Recession crises, but not conclusive during the financial bubble and burst of the second
half of the nineties.
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5.2 Wage setting with enhanced labor flexibility, payroll taxa-
tion, and trade exposure (1992-2009)
The analysis of the interactions allows us to check for the existence of structural changes
in the wage setting eﬀects of the various determinants.
A first salient result (robust across estimation methodologies and model specification)
is an increase in wage persistence ranging from 0.32-0.35 in model (3), to 0.46-0.48 in
model (2). This increase runs in parallel to the lower volatility of real net wages in the
Colombian industry in 1992-2009 (specifically in 1995-2005), which echoes a much reduced
volatility in the rate of inflation. In addition, the larger persistence is accompanied by
lower short-run coeﬃcients, so that it is the relative magnitude of these changes what
determines the variation in the long-run response of wages to its various determinants.18
Regarding the relationship between wages and labor productivity, we find a fall in the
long-run elasticity, going from 0.44 to 0.29 in model (2), and from 0.43 to 0.28 in model
(3) (see Table 6, columns 4 and 8). This implies that the relationship between these
two variables has become weaker. This can be considered one of the collateral pitfalls of
the institutional and trade reform process since it is tempting to associate this finding to
the increasing current account deficit experienced by Colombia in the last decades. The
counterpart is, of course, that wage setting has become more persistent.
In contrast with productivity, the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to minimum
wages remained unaltered around 1.3 in 1992-2009. This implies that the institutional and
trade reforms have not crucially aﬀected the adjustments of net real wages vis-à-vis the
net real minimum wage. This stability is confirmed when looking at the role played by the
price wedge in model (3) which remains quite stable (with a slight increase in the long-run
elasticity going from -5.80 to -6.04 in 1992-2009. In any case, this mildly larger sensitivity
can be associated to the fact that adjustments in nominal wages became more tied to
CPI inflation since 1991, and also to the increased exposure to international markets and
the resulting dramatic downward pressures on producer and consumer prices. As noted
before, the asymmetric price response to these pressures caused a fall in the price wedge.
Thus, in the growingly liberalized environment of 1992-2009, this increased sensitivity to
the price wedge should come as no surprise.
Together with the result on productivity, another key novelty in this period is that
net real wages became less sensitive to changes in payroll taxes with a long-run elasticity
falling from -1.30 to -0.86 in model (2). Although, the long-run coeﬃcients of payroll
taxes in model (3) increase when interacted with 92, it is important to note their lack of
18Note that, as wage persistence increases, the long-run coeﬃcients have a tendency to become larger.
However, this increase might be oﬀset, or even overtaken, by the falls in the short-run wage elasticities.
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significance (column 8 in Table 4). According to this result, and taking into account the
weaker instruments of this specification, we credit the findings obtained through model
(2).
This lower sensitivity of wages with respect to payroll taxes takes place in the context
of their significant rise in the 1990s. This result is consistent with the previous ones
along the following lines. Recall that firms can shift the tax burden on workers through
lower nominal net wages or higher prices. In a growing liberalized labor market, wage
cuts become more feasible than rising prices (in an otherwise growing open environment),
hence the preferred use of the first channel. However, the new situation of full indexation
of nominal wages to the cost of living in the nineties was eﬀectively introducing wage
floors to firms. These wage rigidities, which prevented firms to shift the tax burden to
the workers in the form of lower net wages, help to explain why the sensitivity of wages
with respect to payroll taxes becomes lower in this period.
The last finding is related to the increase in the long-run elasticity of wages with
respect to the degree of trade openness, which rises from 0.11 to 0.15 in model (2), and
from 0.10 to 0.12 in model (3). This increase is consistent with the predicted behavior
of wages according to the work by Arbache et al. (2004). Following a wide liberalization
process, the relative demand for skilled labor in developing countries is expected to rise,
thus leading to wage increases in this group of workers.
6 Multiplicative interactions and marginal eﬀects
As a complementary exercise, in this Section we present the crucial findings from the
estimation of equations (2) and (3) as multiplicative interaction models (see Berry et al.,
2012, for details). Although this procedure is not suitable to investigate changes in the
form of structural breaks, it gives us further insights on the relationship between wages
and their main determinants when they are assumed to be cross-dependant.
In particular, we look at the marginal eﬀects of real minimum wages and the price
wedge on net real wages, conditional on the diﬀerent values taken by payroll taxation and
the degree of trade openness in 1976-1991 and 1992-2009. In this way, we check whether
the reform process (increases in the exposure to international trade and payroll taxation)
have aﬀected the way wages react to these key determinants.
Thus, the new models considered take the following general form:
 = +−1++(∗  )+(∗)+(∗ ∗)+Z+ (5)
where  is a scalar comprising our two variables of interest, min and ; and Z is a
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vector comprising the rest of the explanatory variables —,  ,   and — and
various controls.19
The marginal eﬀects of our variables of interest will thus be given by:20

 =  +  + 

 +  + (  ∗ ) (6)
These marginal eﬀects are presented in figures 4 and 5. Diﬀerent values of trade
openness (in logs) are listed in the horizontal axis, while the left vertical axis shows the
histogram of trade openness corresponding to its distribution in 1976-1991 (in panel a)
and 1992-2009 (in panel b). In the turn, the values in the right vertical axis indicate the
magnitude of the marginal eﬀect. The marginal eﬀects are evaluated at the average payroll
tax rate in each period. Note, also, that Figure 4 corresponds to the model specification
with real minimum wages (column 4 in Table A2), while Figure 5 corresponds to the
model specification with the price wegde (column 8 in Table A2).
Figure 4. Marginal eﬀects of real minimum wages on net real wages.
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19We also conducted the analysis having labor productivity interacted with payroll taxes and the
degree of trade openness, but it was not successful. Still, the results are available upon request.
20The corresponding estimated equations are presented Table A3 in the Appendix. Here we only focus
on the marginal eﬀects derived from those estimations (more precisely, those presented in columns 4 and
8 in consistence with Section 5).
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The marginal eﬀects of real minimum wages range between 0.4 and 0.8 depending on
the degree of trade openness. Looking at the histogram, this range can be further narrowed
to the interval 0.5-0.7 for the relevant values of trade openness in 1976-1991 (those between
7% and 55% corresponding to 2 and 4 in logs, as shown in Figure 4a) and to 0.55-0.65 in
1992-2009 (Figure 4b). Colombia was a relatively more open economy in 1992-2009, this
is why the histogram shifts to the right. However, when the marginal eﬀects are evaluated
at the relevant trade openness and payroll tax values, there is no diﬀerence on the extent
of the wage impact of real minimum wages. This result is consistent with the lack of
structural change in this elasticity when evaluated through the analysis of multiplicative
dummies as in Section 5.
Of course, this conclusion does not preclude the fact that larger values of trade expo-
sure tend to reduce the sensitivity of wages with respect to the minimum wage. The point
here is that this changing sensitivity has not shifted, on aggregate, in the new scenario
of labor market flexibility and enhanced trade liberalization. The implicit result at the
sectoral level is that more open sectors will tend to have less responsive wages to changes
in the minimum wage.
Figure 5 shows the marginal eﬀects of the price wedge.
Figure 5. Marginal eﬀects of the price wedge on net real wages.
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The first remark on these results is that the marginal eﬀects are negative and consistent
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with the analysis in Section 5. The second remark points to the flat slope in the first
period, when payroll taxation was low on average (Figure 5a), which indicates that the
sensitivity of wages with respect to the price wedge is not aﬀected by the degree of trade
openness.
In contrast, in a scenario of high payroll taxation such as the one in 1992-2009, the
marginal eﬀects are negatively sloped (Figure 5b). This implies that the sensitivity of
real wages to the price wedge gets larger along with the degree of trade openness (cases
of extreme openness, such as the ones in the right hand side of the histogram, correspond
to the few very much open manufacturing sectors reported in the Appendix). This larger
sensitivity goes in line with Bems (2014), who points out that increasing input imports
leads to a greater response of the relative price to a given external adjustment.
7 Concluding remarks
We have studied wage determination in the Colombian manufacturing industry and paid
specific attention to the consequences of the institutional and trade reforms carried out
in Colombia during the nineties.
The first salient result is that productivity is not fundamentally driven by labor pro-
ductivity in contrast to the standard theoretical prediction. In addition, the long-run
elasticity of wages with respect to productivity has decreased to 0.30 in the nineties and
noughties, from a value close to 0.45.
This suggests that the institutional measures undertaken by the government did
not improve the scarce connection between workers’ compensation and labor’s eﬃciency
progress. On the contrary, this connection has been worsened. Taking the benchmark one-
to-one relationship between wages and productivity, the failure to reduce this detachment
(or, even worse, increasing it) in a growing globalized economy should be given priority
from policy makers, as it generates distortions in the process of achieving competitiveness
in the manufacturing sector. This is the main lesson that can be drawn from our study
in terms of policy measures.
If the Colombian economy continues to globalize at the same pace than in the last
two decades, this call to strengthen the link between wages and productivity should be
further reinforced.
Another main result is that wage progress in Colombia is largely tied to the cost of
living. This conclusion is obtained from the important role played by the real minimum
wage, or alternatively by the price wedge between manufacturing and consumer prices, as
wage drivers. Here, however, we find no evidence of structural changes in the correspond-
ing long-run relationships. It seems, therefore, that the purchasing power of workers has
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remained relatively isolated from the new institutional and trade scenario.
In terms of payroll taxation (paid by firms), we find the expected negative impact on
net real wages, although we are unable to evaluate the net employment consequences of
the increase in payroll taxes in the nineties. Our contribution here is the identification of a
fall in the wage elasticity with respect to these taxes (from 1.3 to 0.86), which is the joint
outcome of changes in the institutional setting such as the enhanced indexation of nominal
wages to CPI inflation, and the asymmetric downward pressures on manufacturing and
consumption prices resulting from the liberalization process. The consequence of this
lower tax shifting is a loss in firms’ cost competitiveness which, although we have not
dealt with it, may use employment as an instrument to oﬀset this loss.
What is, then, the counterpart of the lower explanatory power of productivity?
On one side, wage persistence has increased. This is connected to the lower capacity
of firms to shift taxes. Although firms can shift the tax burden on workers through lower
nominal net wages or higher prices, in a growingly liberalized labor market wage cuts
become more feasible than rising prices. Hence the preferred use of wage cuts. However,
the new situation of full indexation of nominal wages to the cost of living in Colombia in
the nineties was eﬀectively introducing wage floors to firms. This explains the increase in
wage persistence.
On the other side, the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to the degree of trade
openness did also increase. This suggests that, following the liberalization process, the
relative demand for skilled labor went up and pushed the compensation of this type of
workers.
As a complementary exercise, we have also examined the marginal eﬀects of real
minimum wages and the price wedge on net real wages, conditional on the diﬀerent values
taken by payroll taxation and the degree of trade openness in 1976-1991 and 1992-2009. In
this way, we have checked, from a diﬀerent perspective, whether the impact of these wage
determinants has changed along with the reform process. We have confirmed the stability
of the relationship between net wages and the minimum wage, but we have identified a
diﬀerent sensitivity with respect to the price wedge depending on the level (low or high)
of payroll taxation. This requires further research.
Overall, our findings call for a policy agenda in which wage indexation is reduced and
a true wage bargaining system is brought in. This would allow workers’ compensation
to reflect more faithfully eﬃciency progress which, by all means, should be a critical
target to solve the competitive problem of the Colombian industry and help, in this way,
rebalancing the huge trade deficit attained with the liberalization program.
Our analysis can be refined in a variety of directions. Further research should control
for types of employment given that, both institutional and trade reforms, may have diﬀer-
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ent eﬀects on wages by type of worker. For example, regarding payroll taxes, international
evidence suggests that there is less tax shifting for blue-collar than for white-collar work-
ers. Beyond that, for developing countries there is growing empirical evidence showing
that trade liberalization exerts a positive eﬀect on high-skill labor wages, while there is
no eﬀect on low-skill labor wages.
Another research avenue is to aim at an individual assessment of how these reforms
aﬀected wage setting in each productive sector. In that case, the starting hypothesis would
be that each sector’s response is connected to its degree of exposure to international trade.
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8 Appendix
Figure A1. Export and import shares, and trade deficit
of the manufacturing industry. 1975-2010.
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Table 1 informs on the homogeneity of the opening process across sectors. Within this
relatively homogeneous process, we acknowledge that some branches experienced particu-
larly intensive opening processes. Two of them were already globalized in 1974-1991 (S15
on manufacture of machinery and equipment including manufacture of oﬃce, accounting
and computing machinery, 232%; and S17 on manufacture of medical, precision and op-
tical instruments, watches and clocks, 156%), but reached degrees of trade openness of
387% and 226%, respectively, in 1992-2009. The three other ones departed from values
much below, but also became fully opened industries in 1992-2009: S16 on manufacture of
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electrical machinery, radio, television and communication equipment, 256%; S18 on manu-
facture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, and other transport equipment, 151%;
and S19 on manufacture of furniture, 125%. This particularly intensive transformations
are taken into account in our empirical analysis.
Table A1. Trade openness and output shares by industries.
Sector Trade openness Share in total industry GDP
1974-1991 1992-2009 1974-1991 1992-2009
S2 5.1 29.2 2.6 0.7
S11 8.3 42.3 4.2 5.0
S1 9.7 28.2 28.4 28.9
S3 11.6 68.8 10.9 5.3
S12 13.3 22.1 5.8 7.3
S6 19.2 36.8 0.8 0.6
S7 23.1 39.5 3.7 3.8
S5 23.4 69.6 1.7 1.1
S14 24.5 60.3 3.7 2.8
S8 25.7 23.7 2.8 3.6
S4 29.2 39.2 3.0 3.6
S19 39.9 125 1.6 1.2
S10 47.6 79.8 12.8 15.4
S9 52.2 44.5 4.3 9.0
S18 59.7 151 4.1 3.2
S16 64.2 256 3.2 2.2
S13 71.9 111 4.0 3.9
S17 156 226 0.5 0.7
S15 232 387 1.9 1.7
Total 48.2 96.8 100 100
Notes: Classification based on International Standard Industrial Classification, Rev. 3.
All variables are expressed in percent. Sectors: Manufacture of food products and beverages (S1);
Manufacture of tobacco products (S2); Manufacture of textiles (S3); Manufacture of wearing
apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur (S4); Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear (S5); Manufacture of wood and of products of wood
and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials (S6); Manufacture
of paper and paper products (S7); Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (S8);
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (S9); Manufacture of chemicals
and chemical products (S10); Manufacture of rubber and plastics products (S11); Manufacture
of other non-metallic mineral products (S12); Manufacture of basic metals (S13); Manufacture
of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (S14); Manufacture of machinery
and equipment n.e.c.; and manufacture of oﬃce, accounting and computing machinery (S15);
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; and manufacture of radio, television and
communication equipment and apparatus (S16); Manufacture of medical, precision and optical
instruments, watches and clocks (S17); Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers,
and other transport equipment (S18); Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (S19).
32
Table A2. Bias-corrected LSDVC estimators.
MODEL I MODEL II
Bias order AH AB BB AH AB BB
O (1 ) 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.57 0.57 0.60
O (1 ) 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.58 0.59 0.61
O (1−1−2) 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.69
Notes: This table only displays persistence coeﬃcients. Columns provide the consistent
estimator chosen to initialize the bias correction. AH = Anderson and Hsiao (1982);
AB = Arellano and Bond (1991); BB = Blundell and Bond (1998).
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Table A3. Multiplicative interaction models.
Dependent variable: 
MODEL I MODEL II
OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS OLS FE FE-2SLS FE-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
−1 088
[0000] 053[0000] 054[0000] 054[0000] 087[0000] 059[0000] 061[0000] 058[0000]
  005
[0000] 002[0456] −001[0312] −001[0350] 005[0000] 003[0310] 001[0647] 000[0904]
 −012
[0000]
−010
[0000]
−010
[0000]
−011
[0000]
000
[0753] 005[0007] 011[0000] 021[0000]
 021
[0447] 050[0017] 050[0002] 050[0001]
 −269
[0019]
−309
[0004]
−1896
[0000]
−3279
[0002]
  −050
[0492]
−060
[0504]
−065
[0484]
−068
[0457]
−067
[0000]
−050
[0000]
−104
[0000]
−155
[0001]
 006
[0857] 039[0231] 040[0441] 041[0425] 000[0530] −002[0165] −001[0542] 000[0944]
 ∗   005
[0573] 008[0439] 009[0374] 009[0352]
 ∗  −001
[0916]
−006
[0257]
−006
[0470]
−006
[0450]
 ∗   ∗  −000
[0933]
000
[0551] 000[0721] 000[0687]
 ∗   047
[0246] 053[0177] 596[0000] 1068[0003]
 ∗  001
[0969] 002[0888] 313[0001] 580[0007]
 ∗   ∗  −000
[0650]
000
[0970] −113[0002] −210[0002]
8083 −002
[0137]
−004
[0000]
−004
[0000]
−004
[0000]
−002
[0071]
−002
[0007]
−000
[0780]
001
[0515]
9700 003
[0002] 003[0000] 002[0000] 002[0000] −002[0001] −004[0000] −005[0000] −007[0000]
0809 −006
[0001]
−005
[0016]
−005
[0010]
−005
[0005]
−004
[0014]
−001
[0769]
−001
[0689]
−000
[0996]
 −036
[0857]
−030
[0820]
298
[0000] 503[0000]
 646 646 627 627 646 646 627 627
2 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.87
 829
[0016] 1610[0007] 822[0016] 701[0030]
 191
[0167] 976[0045] 029[0589] 000[0968]
 407.8 160.4 2.78 2.04
Notes: All variables are expressed in logs. P-values in brackets. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.
FE: Fixed Eﬀects. FE-2SLS: Fixed eﬀects using Two Step Least Squares.
 : Under identification test.  : Hansen test.  : Weak identification test.
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